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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
TORTS--ASSUMPTION OF RISK BY DRIVING INSTRUCTOR
Plaintiff voluntarily accompanied defendant, who had just
received a learner's permit, in defendant's car for the purpose of
teaching her to drive. Injured in an ensuing accident, plaintiff
brought this action for negligence. Held: Failure to charge
separately as to assumption of risk constituted reversible error.
Le Fleur v. Virgilia, 280 App. Div. 1035, 117 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (4th
Dep't 1952).
The rule that a passenger assumes the risk of his driver's
inexperience and lack of skill, while employed by some jurisdic-
tions, Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267 (1926), 51.
A. L. R. 576 (1927) ; Kelly v. Gagnon, 121 Neb. 113, 236 N. W. 160
(1931); Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N. C. 648, 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1942);
conztra: Holland v. Pitachelli, 299 Mass. 554, 13 N. E. 2d, 390
(1938), has not been directly before the courts of New York. See
dissenting opinion of McNamee, J., in Spaulding v. Minea7, 239
App. Div. 460, 463, 268 N. Y. Supp. 772, 775 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd,
264 N. Y. 589, 191 N. E. 576 (1934), see Howard v. Reid, 225 App.
Div. 399 (4th Dep't 1929). However, New York has applied the
doctrine of assumption of risk to cases involving mechanical de-
fects in automobiles, Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 177 N. E.
77 (1930) ; Lynes v. Debenedictus, 277 App. Div. 674, 102 N. Y. S.
2d 684 (3d Dep't 1951); blowouts, Kemp v. Stephenson, 139 Mlisc.
38, 247 N. Y. Supp. 650 (N. Y. Cty. Ct. 1931); riding in exposed
position, Wunsch v. Colonial Sand c Stone Co., 257 App. Div. 857,
12 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (2d Dep't 1939); riding fire truck on festive
occasion, Nardone v. Milton Fire Dist., 261 App. Div. 717, 27
N. Y. S. 2d 489 (3d Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N. Y. 654, 42 N. E. 2d 746
(1942).
The doctrine of assumption of risk is based on the maxim
Volenti non fit injuria, i. e., that to which a person assents is not
deemed in law an injury. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement
Co., 250 N. Y. 479, 166 N. E. 173 (1929), noted, 15 Coni. L. Q. 132
(1930). To invoke the doctrine it is essential that there be: (1)
Knowledge and appreciation of the danger on the part of the one
assuming the risk, i. e., some foresight of the consequences,
McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391
(1928); Maltz v. Board of Education of New York City, 114
N. Y. S. 2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1952); therefore, the doctrine is not
applicable if the danger is obscure and unrecognized. Taontillo
v. Goldstein Amusement Co., 248 N. Y. 286, 162 N. E. 82 (1928) ;
Zurick G. A. & L. Ins. Co. v. Childs, 253 N. Y. 324, 171 N. E. 391
(1930). (2) The risk must have been freely and voluntarily en-
tered into. This consent may be expressed, Kirshinbaum v. Gen.
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eral Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N. Y. 489, 180 N. E. 245 (1932) ;
or implied from the parties' conduct under the circumstances.
Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y.
Supp. 505 (3d Dep't 1935).
The defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence, while closely associated, are entirely distinct. McEvoy v.
City of New York, 266 App. Div. 445, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 746 (1943),
aff'd, 292 N. Y. 654, 55 N. E. 2d 517 (1944). Contributory negli-
gence involves some fault or breach of duty on the part of the
plaintiff, who has failed to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety. PRossER, TORTs § 51; HARPER ox ToRTs §§ 130, 131. On the
other hand, assumption of risk may bar recovery even though
the plaintiff has been free from any fault. See Warren, Volenti
Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 H.Azv. L. R. 457 (1895).
The court in the instant case, therefore, rationalized that
since assumption of risk is a separate defense, it was confusing
in the eyes of this court for the trial judge to introduce his charge
as to assumption of risk by stating, "It is the law of this state
that when a person voluntarily proceeds into a dangerous position,
he is usually guilty of contributory negligence if an accident
results by reason of that. This is so because when a person as-
sumes a risk which is obvious that fact is to be taken into account
in measuring his care or lack of care as I have defined it . . "
Record p. 494. See 10 BLASHFIEsU, CYOLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6627, 6741.
Although the immediate procedural basis for the court's
ruling was the failure to instruct separately as to assumption of
risk, the court has in effect declared that if the jury finds that one
instructing another how to drive an automobile:
(1) Knew of the inexperience and lack of skill of the learner,
(2) Voluntarily entered into this relationship, and
(3) Was injured by reason of this lack of skill and inexperi-
ence,
such instructor has as a matter of law assumed the risk
and is barred from recovery. In view of the elements of assump-
tion of risk, as previously discussed, this would not seem to be an
incorrect application of the doctrine.
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